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ABSTRACT: The paper emphasizes significant resemblances between the Informal Logic Initiative
and the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS) – the Polish philosophical movement (1895-1939), the rise of
which is associated with “the Golden Age of Science and Letters”. The correspondence between
informal logic and the logical studies of the LWS will be explored by discussing their subject-matter,
goals, and methods. The project focused on applying logical studies of the LWS in analyzing and
assessing arguments will be proposed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of the paper is to propose the direction of systematic inquiry into the
overlap between the Informal Logic Initiative and the logical studies of the LvovWarsaw School (LWS) – the Polish philosophical movement (1895-1939)
established by Twardowski at the end of the 19th century in Lwów (Lvov) (see
Woleński, 1989, Ch. 1; Lapointe et al., 2009). Mostly because of the developments of
mathematical logic made by such thinkers as Lejewski, Leśniewski, Łukasiewicz,
Mostowski, Sobociński, Tarski, and many others (see, e.g., Coniglione et al. (eds.),
1993; Kneale & Kneale, 1962; McCall, 1967; Woleński, 1995), the rise of the LWS is
recognized as “the Golden Age of Science and Letters” (Simons, 2002).
Although analytic philosophers discuss in details the heritage of the LWS
(see, e.g. Jadacki, 2009; Simons, 1992; Smith, 2006; Woleński, 1989), it is not
sufficiently represented in world’s philosophy. According to the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Woleński, 2010), apart from the achievements in
mathematical logic, the LWS is scarcely known outside Poland as the broader
philosophical enterprise:
As far as the matter concerns international importance, one thing is clear. The
logical achievements of the LWS became the most famous. Doubtless, the Warsaw
school of logic contributed very much to the development of logic in the 20th
century. Other contributions are known but rather marginally. This is partially due
to the fact that most philosophical writings of the LWS appeared in Polish. However,
this factor does not explain everything. Many writings of the LWS were originally
published in English, French or German. However, their influence was very
moderate, considerably lesser than that of similar writings of philosophers from the
leading countries (Woleński, 2010).
Mohammed, D., & Lewiński, M. (Eds.). Virtues of Argumentation. Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of the Ontario
Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 22-26 May 2013. Windsor, ON: OSSA, pp. 1-10.
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Similar observations are made by Simons, who notices that the LWS is not
sufficiently recognized outside Poland. However, some intensive efforts towards its
popularization are undertaken:
So interest in the Poles remains scant and patchy outside Poland. However, Jan
Woleński, Jacek Juliusz Jadacki and other Poles continue to write about the
movement in the old country, and there are several scholars abroad who are doing
good work, notably Arianna Betti in Amsterdam, and Anna Zielińska and Wioletta
Miskiewicz in Paris. So the future is of historical studies on this Golden Age is, if not
rosy, not wholly bleak (Simons, 2002).

Hence, the motivation of the paper is to show that the current international
recognition of the Polish logical studies is disproportionate to the rich repertoire of
methods of inquiry into language, reasoning, and argument proposed by the LWS.
Because of the fact that some ideas of the school concern not only formal, but also
informal analysis and evaluation of arguments, the main question is: what ideas
present in the logical studies of the LWS are in line with the major research stands
in informal logic? Amongst the achievements of the LWS which are significant for
giving an answer to this question there are: the educational idea of improving
critical thinking skills proposed by Ajdukiewicz and Czeżowski (Section 2), and the
accounts of fallacies and superstitions conceived as pitfalls of non-critical thinking,
as discussed by Kamiński and Bocheński (Section 3). These two components: the
“positive” (i.e. rules of critical thinking) and the “negative” (i.e. fallacies as violations
of these rules) were combined by Ajdukiewicz within the unified methodological
framework for performing rules for carrying out knowledge-gaining procedures
(Section 4). Concluding remarks (Section 5) justify the need of the systematic study
of the correspondence between Polish logical studies and the Informal Logic
Movement.
2. THE IDEAL OF A CRITICAL THINKER IN THE LVOV-WARSAW SCHOOL
Although the researchers of the LWS do not use the term ‘critical thinking’, the
school elaborated its own original ideal of the critical thinker. It may be identified by
examining the core concern of the LWS which was to seek for applications of logic in
natural language communication. This attitude is clearly explained by Tarski:
[...] by perfecting and sharpening the tools of thought, [logic] makes man more
critical – and thus makes less likely their being misled by all the pseudo-reasonings
to which they are in various parts of the world incessantly exposed today (Tarski,
1995, p. xi).

The presence of the ideal of the critical thinker within the Polish logical
studies is pointed out by Groarke in the entry on informal logic published in the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
In its origins and continued evolution, informal logic has often been allied with
educational goals, with the aim of developing ways of analyzing everyday reasoning
that can inform, and possibly be the foundation for, general education. In North
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America and other English speaking countries, such ideals have been associated
with the “Critical Thinking Movement,” which aims to inform and improve public
reasoning and debate by promoting models of education which emphasize the
critical examination of beliefs and decisions, and the development of the skills that
this requires. In this and other regards, informal logic has significant affinities with
the “pragmatic logic” movement one finds within the Polish logical tradition
(Groarke, 2011).

The specification of the key tendencies of the LWS which correspond to the
subject-matter, goals and methods of informal logic may consist in exposing: (i) the
broad notion of logic, (ii) the educational ideal of logical culture, (iii) the pragmatic
account of language and argument, and (iv) the rule of conceptual precision.1
(i) The broad notion of logic. The crucial resemblance between the LWS and
the Informal Logic Initiative lies in the claim that logic is not equivalent to formal
logic. As Johnson points out, the tendency to tailor the concept of logic exclusively to
formal deductive logic (FDL) is inadequate because it “cuts of logic from important
parts of its historical development” (Johnson, 1996, p. 79). Within the LWS, the focus
on formal models of language and reasoning did not entail the claim that logic is
equivalent to formal logic. On the contrary, the representatives of the LWS
employed the broad conception of logic that embraces not only formal logic, but
also semiotics and methodology of science (see e.g., Ajdukiewicz, 1974, p. 2-4;
Koszowy, 2010, pp. 32-33). The consequence of accepting this broad account is the
claim that ‘logical skills’ encompass not only the skills of employing formal tools in
language analysis, but also the skills of using semiotics to analyze natural language
discourse, and using methodology of science in evaluating definitions,
classifications, and questions occurring in the scientific inquiry (see the Appendix A
in Johnson, 2009, pp. 38-39).
(ii) The ideal of logical culture. The handy umbrella term used by the
representatives of the LWS to denote the knowledge and skills of logic is ‘logical
culture’ (Ajdukiewicz, 1965). The main similarity between informal logic and the
Polish analytical tradition lies in a coherent research and education program which
is to be instrumental in educating people to express their thoughts clearly and
precisely and reason correctly. The conception of logical culture joins two
components: (1) advances in the logical studies (i.e. research in logic) are claimed to
be applicable in (2) teaching critical thinking skills (Czeżowski, 2000, p. 68;
Koszowy, 2010).
(iii) The pragmatic account of language and argument. The natural feature of
informal logic is the pragmatic approach to arguments (e.g. Johnson, 1996, pp. 103106; Walton, 2008, p. 2). The LWS employed the similar approach. A clear example
of including pragmatic perspective into the philosophy of language and argument
are Twardowski's views on symbolization in logic discussed in his paper
``Symbolomania and Pragmatophobia'' (Twardowski, 1927/1965). The point of
departure of Twardowski's analyses is the critique of the view (defended, amongst
Another intriguing research task would be to examine the correspondence between the ideal of
logical culture in the LWS with the pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion. However, this
topic goes beyond the scope of the paper.
1
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others by Łukasiewicz and Leśniewski) which holds that symbolization in formal
logic is the exclusive source of precision and clarity of language. According to
Twardowski, this radical view called ‘symbolomania’ focuses on pure symbols
without taking into account their uses. Symbolomania is in line with another
attitude labeled by Twardowski ‘pragmatophobia’ which tends to avoid any
considerations concerning objects which are represented by symbols:
[...] tendency to place symbols above things may result in bending things to comply
with symbols, that is, making statements about things according to what follows
from symbol-based assumptions and operations, regardless of what things tell us
about themselves, or even contrary to what they tell us about themselves
(Twardowski, 1927/1965, p. 5).

As Smith observes, Twardowski's motivation for the critique of
symbolomania and pragmatophobia lies in his efforts to give an adequate account of
cognitive processes:
Mental processes ought, as it were, by guiding the successive stages in the process of
production, to ensure that a meaning of an appropriate kind is capable of being
bestowed upon its products and thereby also ensure that these products do not
depart from the world of things (Smith, 1994, p. 186).

This approach illustrates an interesting balance in the LWS between the
formal and the informal approaches to language and argument. On the one hand
Twardowski appreciated the role of symbolization in modern science, and, on the
other hand, he strongly stressed the need of applying semantic and pragmatic
criteria of correctness of thinking and cognizing. This tendency is in accord with
some accounts of informal logic (e.g. Walton, 2008, pp. 1-2), which tend to achieve
the balance between the indispensability of formal tools in argument analysis and
the necessity of employing the pragmatic perspective.
(iv) The rule of conceptual precision. One of the main goals of informal logic
which is the clarification of meaning (Johnson, 1996, p. 55-57 and 68-69): the
valuable attitude in analyzing and evaluating arguments is to be sensitive to
questions of language and meaning. The same postulate lies in the very core of the
methodological program of the LWS. Twardowski and his students believed that
solid analysis of the uses of language is the point of departure for solving
philosophical problems in the most reasonable way. For example, they claimed that
one of the reasons of common misunderstandings in philosophical discussions lies
in the fact that the statements in a discourse are usually not sufficiently clear
because of the use of some ambiguous expressions. Thus, the key goal of the analysis
of philosophical problems was to formulate a given term or statement as clearly as
possible in order to avoid the obscure style in thinking and expressing thoughts.
This ``rule of conceptual precision” was one of the “fundamental methodological
rules scrupulously observed in the Lvov-Warsaw School” (Jadacki, 2009, p. 69).
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3. FALLACIES AS PITFALLS OF NON-CRITICAL THINKING
The systematic study of the logical fallacies was organically connected with
popularizing the ideal of logical culture in Poland. Apart from the “positive” goal of
improving knowledge and skills of logical culture, the “negative” part of inquiry was
to identify typical fallacies in speech communication and reasoning. The common
tendency of the study of the fallacies in the LWS manifests itself in the optimistic
claim that the study of the common mishaps of language use, reasoning and
argumentation helps to become aware of the typical cognitive and linguistic
mechanisms of arriving at error. Moreover, the tradition of the LWS tends to avoid
the `naive' fallacy approach which consists in identifying fallacies by employing the
catalogue of typical fallacies. Instead, it aims at proposing concrete rules for correct
thinking and language use.
These tendencies may be observed in Kamiński’s taxonomy of logical
fallacies (Kamiński, 1962, pp. 29-39; Koszowy, 2012, pp. 34-40). Kamiński
distinguishes four general types of logical fallacies, namely epistemological fallacies,
semiotic fallacies, fallacies of reasoning (``logical fallacies in a strict sense''), and
methodological fallacies of employing rules governing knowledge-gaining
procedures. This systematization may be conceived as a unifying account which
aims to grasp a variety of violations of the rules of proper cognition.
Another exemplification of the common tendencies in the study of the
fallacies are Bocheński's analyses of One hundred superstitions (1994). Bocheński's
account of superstitions has a pragmatic dimension, because his main motivation is
to help people to recognize typical mechanisms commonly employed in the social
sphere in order to convince someone to accept false beliefs. Moreover, superstitions
are not only described exclusively from the inferential perspective (by detecting
errors in reasoning), but also from the dialogical point of view (by identifying
typical moves in the dialogue which are employed in order to spread superstitions
in the social sphere), as well as within the rhetorical approach (by analysing
utterances aimed at convincing someone to accept a superstition). Hence,
Bocheński’s studies of superstitions clearly refer to the broader (i.e. social, cognitive
and communicative) context.
For example, the typical superstition discussed by Bocheński concerns the
appeal to authority (Bocheński, 1994, pp. 24-26). The key part of Bocheński’s theory
of authority (Bocheński, 1974, Ch. 4) is the distinction between ‘epistemic authority’
and ‘deontic authority’. This ambiguity of ‘authority’ is presented by Walton (1997,
Ch. 3) as the distinction between cognitive (de facto) and administrative (de iure)
authority (see also Budzyńska, 2010). In what follows I propose the reconstruction
of Bocheński’s analyses of the superstitions concerning authority by identifying
them as fallacious argumentation schemes. According to Bocheński, a typical
superstition concerning authority relies on claiming that every appeal to authority is
against reason. This superstition may be reconstructed as follows.
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Fallacious scheme: “authority is against reason”
Every appeal to authority is against reason.
One should always rely on reason.
X is an authority in a given field.
X says p.
------------------------------------------------------p should not be accepted.
The second case of a superstition concerning authority is the belief which is
based on confusing deontic authority with epistemic authority. It may be
reconstructed as follows.
Fallacious scheme: “confusing epistemic and deontic authority”
X is authorized to give directives.
X says p.
p belongs to assertives.
------------------------------------------------------p should be accepted.
From the fact that X is a deontic authority one implies that the assertive
(which belongs to the domain of the epistemic authority) is true. This case may be
analysed as a clear instance of equivocation: ‘authority’ means either deontic
authority which is authorized to formulate directives or epistemic authority which is
authorized to formulate assertives.
4. FROM THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENCE TO THE THEORY OF CRITICAL
ARGUMENTATION
Another core concern of the LWS was to combine the ‘positive’ part of inquiry aimed
at establishing the set of rules for critical thinking (as discussed in Section 2) with
the ‘negative’ part of fallacies conceived as common pitfalls of non-critical thinking
(presented in Section 3). This idea relies on proposing the model based on the rules
of performing various knowledge-gaining procedures. In what follows I call these
rules ‘methodological’, for rules for performing some typical knowledge-gaining
procedures are investigated by the general methodology of science. Among these
procedures the most significant are: reasoning, questioning, defining, classifying
objects and formulating and testing hypotheses (Czeżowski, 2000, p. 68).
The methodological framework for the knowledge-gaining procedures may
be found within the program of pragmatic logic proposed by Ajdukiewicz (1974).
The term ‘pragmatic logic’ refers to a discipline aimed at applying logic (in a broad
sense) in analyzing and evaluating knowledge gaining procedures. The program of
pragmatic logic is also based on the idea that general (logical and methodological)
rules of scientific investigation should be applied in everyday communication. The
‘pragmatic dimension’ of this approach relies on moving from the practice of
6
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researchers towards formulating methodological standards (rules, norms) of
performing various knowledge-gaining procedures:
The standards of correctness of research procedures, as formulated in methodology,
are not dictated by it to researchers in advance. Such standards are derived from
practical activities of competent researchers, who approve of some procedures in
research, they disapprove of others. [...] In other words, competent researchers
develop, as a result of their practical activities, what might be termed a research
conscience, but they do not always clearly realize the principles by which that
‘conscience’ of theirs is guided (Ajdukiewicz, 1974, p. 187).

Ajdukiewicz specifies this general idea by analyzing various cases of: (1)
word use, (2) questioning, (3) reasoning and inference, and (4) methodological
types of sciences such as deductive and inductive sciences. On the basis of this
framework a unified set of methodological rules may be determined (see Koszowy,
2010, pp. 37-38). An example procedure which is investigated within this
framework is defining. Two types of rules for defining may be distinguished:
structural and pragmatic. Structural rules tell us what the proper structure of a
given kind of definition should be. Amongst other tasks, they allow to identify
definitions which are too broad, too narrow, or viciously circular. As examples of
such structural rules the following may be mentioned (see, e.g. Czeżowski, 2000, pp.
68-69):
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

An explicit definition should not be circular: in the case of an
explicit definition, the word defined (definiendum) must not be
used in the definiens.
The extensions of the definiendum and definiens of a lexical
definition must not be mutually exclusive.
A definition should not be too broad: the extension of the
definiens of a lexical definition must not be superior to the
extension of the definiendum.
A definition should not be too narrow: the extension of the
definiens of a lexical definition must not be inferior to the
extension of the definiendum.
A definition should not be negative if it can be affirmative.

The pragmatic rules of defining concern the context in which definitions are
used. They are applied to identify such errors of defining as ignotum per ignotum, or
confusing various kinds of definitions. There exists a variety of pragmatic rules. As
examples of such rules the following may be mentioned (see, e.g. Ajdukiewicz, 1974,
Ch. 5):
(1)
(2)
(3)

Descriptive definitions should not be confused with normative
ones.
Lexical definitions should not be confused with stipulative
ones.
Real definitions should not be confused with persuasive ones.
7
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(4)
(5)

In a real definition only essential (or relevant) attributes of the
defined object should be included.
Among the essential (or relevant) attributes we should choose
the constitutive ones (those which determine the whole), and
disregard consecutive attributes (those which are dependent
on and determined by the constitutive attributes).

In line with numerous methods of evaluating definitions in informal logic
(see, e.g. Walton & Macagno, 2010), the rules extracted from the works of Czeżowski
and Ajdukiewicz may be employed as a model of evaluating definitions in
argumentation. In order to exemplify some applications of this model (see Koszowy,
2013, pp. 27-30), let us suppose that two parties debate whether any restrictions on
the access to the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) are justified. Let us also
suppose that both parties agree that the GII is the source of information. The party
who is skeptical about any restrictions on the Internet, advances the following
definition: the term ‘knowledge’ in its common use refers to the sum of information.
After formulating this definition the party proceeds by advancing the argument: if
‘knowledge’ refers to the sum of information, so the more information we collect,
the more knowledge we possess; and as we all know, the Internet allows us to
gather various kinds of information, so it gives us an excellent opportunity to extend
our knowledge of the world. Therefore the access to the GII should not be restricted.
The case is solved if this definition of the term ‘knowledge’ is accepted. Nobody
disagrees that we have the right to search for knowledge. So there is no reason to
restrict the access to the GII if it gives us knowledge. In this case the methodological
rule to distinguish between a lexical definition of the term as commonly understood
in a given language and a stipulative definition which projects the meaning of a
given term (rule 2 on the list of pragmatic rules) is violated.
5. CONCLUSION
The exposition of the resemblances between the ideal of logical culture in the LWS
and the Informal Logic Initiative in North America may constitute the point of
departure for building the framework for future inquiry. Amongst the ideas of the
LWS which are promising candidates for three main pillars of the future research
project there are: (i) the account of pragmatic foundations of entailment as a clear
example of the ideal of the critical thinker in the LWS, (ii) the account of deontic
(administrative, de iure authority, and (iii) the study of methodological rules as
applied to identifying fallacies.
(i) The exemplification of bridging the gap between purely formal and purely
descriptive approaches to language and argument are pragmatic foundations of
entailment laid by Łuszczewska-Romahnowa (1962) and Ajdukiewicz (1974). Hence
the model way of unifying of the normative and descriptive accounts of arguments
within the Polish logical studies could be proposed.
(ii) The theory of authority proposed by Bocheński (1974) is clearly in line
with current research strands in informal logic. For example, Walton’s (1997)
analyses of appeals to expert opinion may be compared with Bocheński’s studies of
8
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epistemic and deontic authority. Since Walton’s approach focuses on the epistemic
authority, an intriguing task would be to make use of Bocheński’s analyses in
building the model of appeals to deontic authority. Such a model could be based on
the typical argumentation schemes for appeals to deontic authority (see Budzyńska,
2010) which could be accompanied by the set of critical questions used to evaluate
such appeals. This project could be a clear instance of combining the achievements
of informal logic with the Polish logical studies.
(iii) The next goal would to identify fallacies by means of methodological
rules elaborated in pragmatic logic. The motivation for this inquiry lies in the core
thesis defended by the members of the LWS which holds that the knowledge of
typical fallacies allows the party in a dialogue or discussion to defend against typical
pitfalls of critical thinking. This task could be accomplished by providing
argumentation schemes for the fallacies and superstitions discussed by Kamiński
and Bocheński.
The main advance of the proposed project lies in the fact that the three
pillars of further inquiry have in fact a common virtue: instead of starting from
abstract models and theories, they base on the actual language use and
argumentative practice.
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